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Introduction
The existence of accessible legal mechanisms for settling disputes in consumer relations is key to the maintenance of a "healthy" market. When the consumer relation in focus involves essential services, such as power, health, communications, etc., the consumer may give an important contribution to the regulation of the system, by demanding the maintenance of minimal standards of quality in the services provided. A key channel for such demands is that of legal litigation.
Legal litigation may have the side-effect of generating great increase in judicial courts caseload, if used in violation of the basic assumptions about the legal practice. According to code of ethics for the legal practice in Brazil, as promulgated by the Brazilian Bar Association (Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil, 1995) , it is unethical for lawyers to stimulate clients to litigate.
Lawyers may advertise their services, but the demand for litigation must arise from clients. This is also a known phenomenon on other countries (Luther, 1958) , where legal ethics may not be as restrictive. Even tough in Brazil the violation of this ethical code does not constitute a crime but it is frowned upon by the legal community.
In recent years, the recourse to litigation to settle consumer relations has become very popular in Brazil. The creation of the JEC (Civil Special Courts), in which the assistance of a lawyer is not required and no legal fees are charged, allied to the overall decrease in the times to reach a judicial decision, has led to a marked increase in the number of consumers demanding for legal settlement of their consumer conflicts.
These changes in judiciary, when taken together with the poor quality of services of brazilian companies, especially in the utilities sector, has spiked the interest of a number of law firms to stimulate litigation, through marketing campaigns or even by fraudulent litigation, in which the parts are not even aware of the lawsuit. This behavior is in blatant violation of the Brazilian Bar Association's code of ethics, but has largely gone unchecked and has become an important source of business for many law firms.
In the company examines in this study, approximately 1% of its clients litigate every year. Although this number may look small, it is responsible for a substantial financial burden to the company, and for a great work overload to the judiciary system as well. It can be estimated from official statistics A considerable fraction of these lawsuits originates from law firms which stimulate such litigation. Not all stimulated litigation are done in bad-faith, but may be uncalled for and constitute a waste of important resource which is the free access to justice as provided by the JEC.
Since the only way to identify firms which deviate from professional ethics in this matter, is through careful investigation -advertisement identification, fieldwork, interviews -which can be costly and time-consuming, in this paper we show statistical properties of lawyer-client networks can help to discrimi-nate between law firms which recruit their clients ethically from those which unethically stimulate litigation. From now on, those will be referred to as unethical recruiters (UR).
The analysis is based on statistical properties of the lawyer-client networks, namely on the distribution of the number of clients per lawyer/lawfirm, which fits nicely to a power-law model. Based on observations that confirmed URs appear to be outliers of this distribution. We design a statistical test to identify potential URs. In the statistical literature (Sornette, 2009 ), outliers to power-law distributions are called Dragon-kings.
We postulate that unethical recruitment act as an amplifying mechanism turning URs into the Dragon-kings of the distribution, in the sense of Sornette (2009). Dragon-kings are defined by this author as "extreme events that do not belong to the same population as the other events, in a precise quantitative and mechanistic sense". The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, the data which motivates the analysis is presented and the implications for the Judiciary system and the consumer are discussed. Section 3, contains the proposed models for client acquisition and their assumptions. In section 4,we present the results and discuss their relevance.
The Evidence
The Brazilian judicial system has seen a pronounced growth in consumerrelated litigation in recent years. This growth is in part derived from the economical expansion experienced by the country in the recent past. This expansion in the consumer base of public utilities may help to mask other dynamics taking place within the same population, such as unethical stimulation of litigatory behavior on the part of law firms and/or individual Lawyers.
The analysis shall focus on the electricity distribution sector in a large brazilian city, namely, the municipality of Rio de Janeiro and some adjacent regions. This sector alone display considerable volume of lawsuits (Table 1) , causing the electricity company and the judiciary system important financial burden and work overload.
Legal disputes concerning electricity distribution services are estimated to cost annually around R$ 10 million to a utility company with roughly 4 × 10 6 clients 2 , and more than 10 million reais to the judiciary system in operating costs, according to a study commissioned by the National Council of Justice (IPEA, 2011) . The fraction of this cost which is related to stimulated litigation is not certain, but may add up to more than 20% of the total cost, according to our estimates, based on statistics from the Rio de Janeiro Court of Justice (TJRJ). These costs reinforce the importance of having mechanisms to detect potential abuses of the judicial system. The data used in this study are public in nature and were obtained from the query page on TJRJ's website. The raw data consists of the full lawsuits records. The actual table with number of clients per lawyer used, obtained from the full records, is available as a csv file in the supplementary materials.
Methods
In order to study the system, we propose a generative model to approximate the observed social network of Lawyers and their clients. In such a model we can chose to include unethical recruitment. In this section, we begin by modeling the distribution of clients per lawyer in the actual data and then we present the generative models (with and without unethical recruitment) and the methodology used to parameterize them from the data.
Finally, we generated simulated datasets from the proposed model and compare them to actual data.
Distribution of clients per Lawyer
After analyzing the available lawsuit dataset, we had to exclude a number of lawsuits where we couldn't determine accurately the identity of the lawyer or law firm, due to typographical errors. We have also only retained lawsuits against the main electrical utility company in Rio de Janeiro. This reduced dataset contains 43,973 lawsuits, with 9,155 unique lawyers, comprising at least 86% of the cases. In the dataset, we knew from advertising materials posted on the Internet and other media, that 12 of the lawyers (marked in red on figure 1) were stimulating litigation and therefore fitted the definition of an UR for the purpose of this study.
Upon a first inspection of the data, we noticed that the number of clients (lawsuits) per lawyer or law firm, is distributed according to a power-law (see Figure 1 ).
Figure 1 clearly suggests a power law behavior for the most part of the values. However, there are some points at the distribution's tail, that do not seems to belong to the same distribution as the majority. Having the number of clients per lawyer follow a power law amounts to say that probability of a lawyer having L lawsuits(clients) is given by:
where C is a normalization constant. According to Clauset et al. (2009) there must be a lower bound to the power law behavior. To accurately determine that the underlying distribution of our data is indeed a power-law, we need to estimate this lower bound (L min ) and the value of α. Expressing the normalizing constant in terms of L min and α, we get
To estimate both parameters we used the methodology described by This fact suggests that UR can be considered outliers of the general lawyer distribution. 
Detecting Unethical Lawyers
The position of a lawyer/law firm in the distribution of clients per lawyer, is determined, according to the proposed generative model described below (section 3.3.2), by its recruitment methodology, and their time in business.
After a short while of litigation stimulation, simulations show that they invariably end up as outliers of the power-law degree distribution estimated for the rest of the network.
Detecting outliers in power-law distributions is not an easy task, but there are statistical tests in the literature which claim to consistently identify such outliers, which are called Dragon Kings (Pisarenko and Sornette, 2011; Janczura and Weron, 2012) .
The method by Pisarenko and Sornette (2011) is based on ranking the observations and testing whether the r top values are outliers. Applying this method to our dataset, we found support for the existence of 11-17 outliers in the data-set with 13 being the most likely value (Figure 2 ).
It produces a p-value which is interpreted as explained in table 3.
The second method Janczura and Weron (2012) proposes using the cumulative probability distribution of lawsuits/lawyer to detect outliers. First, the cumulative distribution (F (L)) of lawsuits (clients) per lawyer was cal- 
Removing these 11 outliers and using Clauset et al.'s method for testing whether a power law is the appropriate hypothesis, we obtain p = 0.21, which is better than the value obtained on Section 3.1 for the data including the URs.
Models of Client Acquisition
Having determined that the distribution of clients follows a power-law with the parameters shown on table 2, we propose two models of client acquisition to explain the observed data: One for the ethical client recruitment methods and another for unethical recruitment.
We model the formation of Lawyer-client networks as a random process in which clients find lawyers according to their needs and social contacts.
According to the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB, 1995), the only ethical way for lawyers to acquire clients is through recommendation or through ethical advertisement of their services which does not induce litigation. Successful lawyers are more likely to be recommended to new clients and may have, on average, more resources to advertise their practice. These characteristics lead to a "rich-get-richer" type of network dynamics.
An important class of networks which display this pattern of connectivity are scale-free networks as proposed by Barabási and Albert (1999) . It is defined by the following building rules:
Nodes Growth: Starting with M 0 ≥ 2 nodes, new nodes are added, one at a time to the network.
Preferential Attachment: a node will tend to link to the higher degree nodes. Formally, new nodes will attach to node i with a probability p i :
where k i is the degree of node i.
Barabsi and Albert have shown that the combination of this two rules, leads to a network that has a power-law degree distribution Barabási and Albert (1999), i.e., P (k) ∼ k −α . This property led to this type of network be know as a scale-free network, since its degree distribution is independent of the size of the network.
Many real-world networks have similar topology, e.g., the World Wide
Web (Barabási et al., 2000) , social networks (Kossinets and Watts, 2006) , the Internet (Faloutsos et al., 1999) and metabolic networks (Jeong et al., 2000) . However the standard Barabási-Albert network does not describe adequately the system as the one we are studying because in this particular case, we have to add more than one attachment at each iteration.
Ethical Recruitment
The ethical recruiting behavior of a lawyer or law-firm can also be modeled as a scale-free network, with the difference that our lawyer-client network is a bi-partite one. This means that although the growth rule described for the Barabási-Albert network remains the same, only edges between lawyers and clients are ever formed, since the edges represents lawsuits.
To simulate such a network, we start with a small population of clients and their lawyers, to even out the initial distribution of clients. Then we added Lawyers and clients, according to the following algorithm:
1. Choose a maximum number of lawsuits l max , that is, the maximum number of edges on the network. 5. Connect the new clients to lawyers with probability given by Equation (4).
Steps 3-5 above is repeated until the network reaches the desired size (l max ). See the figure 4, for an illustration of network growth. Motivated by the data, without URs, these parameters were chosen: m 0 = 80, l max = 36600
and n c = 3.
The bi-partite network thus constructed is a scale-free network with α = 2.12 and shows an excellent fit to the observed data (see figures 5).
By visual inspection, is not possible to detect any outliers on the figure 5.
However, it is wise to check if the model does generates Dragon-kings. The figure 6 shows the result for the previously used tests to detect outliers applied on this model. As it should be, there are no dragon-kings (points beyond the confidence bands).
The results obtained from the model of Ethical recruitment seem to support our hypothesized mechanism for ethical client recruitment. But we still need a mechanism to explain the outliers observed in the dataset, which we attribute to unethical recruitment.
Unethical Recruitment of clients
Assuming unethical recruiters as defined in this paper display an additional recruitment mechanism, namely the stimulation of litigation, we now proceed to propose a model for their client recruitment.
We have seen that the word-of-mouth recommendation dynamics, implied by the preferential attachment, cannot explain the points in the tail of the distribution satisfactorily. Therefore, we need to propose an extension to the preferential attachment, to represent their client acquisition tactics.
The network with unethical lawyers is built according to the following algorithm:
1. Chose a maximum number of lawsuits l max , that is, the maximum number of edges on the network.
2. Start the system with m 0 lawyers and m 0 clients, with one client per lawyer. The m 0 must be chosen with care, to avoid much advantage to those initial lawyers and then preventing outliers.
3. Add a new lawyer, connecting it to a client 4. Whit probability p ur this lawyer is marked as unethical.
5. Add n c new clients.
6. Connect the new clients to lawyers with probability given by eq.(4).
7. with probability p c , all unethical lawyers capture a client (stimulated litigation).
Steps 3-7 above is repeated until the network reaches the desired size (l max ). The step 4 is because even though we known which ones are URs, we cannot precisely determine when they started their client recruitment work. 
Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we have managed to demonstrate the distribution of clients per lawyer in a large metropolitan area is compatible with a scale-free bipartite network of lawyers and clients. By proposing an extremely simple model for unethical recruitment based observed behavior of real unethical lawyers, we showed that unethical lawyers can be detected by means of a simple statistical test. We also confirm Sornette's observation that dragonkings are generated by an amplification mechanism (Sornette, 2009 ) which unethical recruitment of clients is a good example of.
Being able to determine the probability of lawyer or law-firm being an unethical recruiter, based only on their number of clients is an important tool regulatory agencies can use to forestall the growth of an industry of moral damages.
Despite the fact that approximately 1% of the clients sue their electricity provider, less then 0.5% of these made previous complaints to the regulatory agency for this sector, the National Agency of Electrical Energy(ANEEL).
This indicates an abuse of the judiciary system, since many of the issues could be resolved extra-judicially.
In these analyses we have assumed that the lawyers have no influence on other lawyers abilities to develop their client base. This is not strictly true as lawyer may recommend other lawyers or form associations to better compete for clients. However, the fact that the data fits very nicely to a power-law, seem to support that the influences among lawyers do not play an important role in the larger picture.
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